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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shane Erick Crawford appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction 
and Commitment. Mr. Crawford was convicted of two counts of lewd conduct. He 
asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it improperly instructed 
the jury. During deliberations the jury asked if touching the breast area of the alleged 
victim constituted manual to genital contact. The district court failed to inform the jury 
that the breast area is not considered genitals and any touching of the breast area could 
not be considered for the lewd conduct charges. The district court's failure to properly 
answer the jury question interfered with Mr. Crawford's right to due process. 
Alternatively, Mr. Crawford asserts that the district court abused its discretion in 
sentencing him to excessive sentences without giving proper consideration to the 
mitigating factors in his case. 
This Appellant's Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertions that 
the district court correctly instructed the jury and its failure to clarify the meaning of a 
commonly understood word was not error, and that even if it was error, the error was 
harmless as to Count II. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Crawford's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE1 
Did the district court deny Mr. Crawford's right to due process of law by incorrectly 
instructing the jury, by failing to clarify, in response to a jury question, that the breast 
area is not a "genital" for purposes of the lewd and lascivious conduct charges? 
1 The State's briefing on the second issue raised in Mr. Crawford's Appellant's Brief is 
unremarkable and, as such, is not addressed in this Reply Brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Denied Mr. Crawford's Right To Due Process Of Law By Incorrectly 
Instructing The Jury, By Failing To Clarify, In Response To A Jury Question, That The 
Breast Area Is Not A "Genital" For Purposes Of The Lewd And Lascivious Conduct 
Charges 
A. The District Court's Failure To Inform The Jury That Manual To Genital Contact 
Does Not Include Touching The Breast Area Was Erroneous 
In the Respondent's Brief, the State has asserted that, "Because 'breasts' and 
'genitals' are commonly understood terms, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
or commit any error in telling the jury to reread its instructions instead of defining the 
word 'genitals."' (R., p.11.) The State also asserts that "the district court did nothing 
overt to mislead the jury in Crawford's trial; it simply told the jury to reread the jury 
instructions." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) 
Mr. Crawford asserts that the State's argument is flawed. First, the State 
appears to be operating under the misunderstanding the Mr. Crawford has asserted that 
the district court was obligated to define "genitals." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) However, 
Mr. Crawford has not made such an assertion and in fact stated in the Appellant's Brief 
that, "Mr. Crawford does not assert that the district court had to define "genitals" for the 
jury, although it could have, but instead asserts that the district court was obligated to 
instruct the jury that touching of the breast area could not constitute lewd conduct." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
The State is correct that Mr. Crawford has not asserted that the initial jury 
instructions were erroneous (Respondent's Brief, p.8); however, he asserts that once 
the jury asked if the touching of the breast area constituted lewd conduct, the failure to 
answer the question mislead the jury. 
3 
State v. Pinkney, 115 Idaho 1152, 1154 (Ct App. 1989), discusses the district 
court's duties when responding to jurors' questions: 
In general, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether, and 
the manner in which, to respond to a question posed by the jury during 
deliberations. I.C.R. 30(b). See also Dawson v. Olson, 97 Idaho 274, 543 
P.2d 499 (1975). This grant of discretion is premised on the assumption 
that the instructions as given are clear, direct and proper statements of the 
law. Dawson v. Olson, supra. Consequently, if a jury expresses doubt or 
confusion on a point of law correctly and adequately covered in a given 
instruction, the trial court in its discretion may explain the given instruction 
or further instruct the jury but it is under no duty to do so. However, if a 
jury makes explicit its difficulties with a point of law pertinent to the 
case, thereby revealing a defect, ambiguity or gap in the instructions, 
then the trial court has the duty to give such additional instructions 
on the law as are reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt 
or confusion. Dawson v. Olson, supra. See also I.C. §§ 19-2132(a) and 
19-2204 (trial court must instruct the jurors on all matters of law 
necessary for their information). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The jury's question, "Does touching of breast-area constitute manual-genital 
contact?" was specific and illustrates that the jury believed there was an ambiguity in 
the instructions. (Augmentation: Jury Questions, Jury Question #3.) It was the district 
court's duty to alleviate the jury's confusion. Mr. Crawford acknowledges that there is a 
line of cases, as noted by the State, that the district court need not define words that are 
commonly understood. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-11.) However, the request was not to 
define the words "genitals" or "breasts," but to direct the jury as to the use of these 
words in terms of what constitutes lewd conduct, something that my not be 
understandable to a juror without further direction. After all, the issue regarding whether 
the touching of breasts constituted lewd conduct had to be resolved by the Idaho 
Supreme Court because trained attorneys were unsure whether such touching could 
constitute lewd conduct. See State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 486-87 (2003). 
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It was apparent from the question that at least some jurors were potentially 
considering that breast area touching could constitute lewd conduct as charged in this 
case. This type of activity is not only different from what Mr. Crawford was originally 
charged, but is not conduct that constitutes the type of crime charged. Jury instructions 
must not permit the defendant to be convicted of conduct that does not constitute the 
type of crime charged. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011 ). The district court's 
failure to clarify that touching the breast area could not constitute lewd conduct 
permitted the jury to find Mr. Crawford guilty of conduct that does not constitute the 
crime for which he was charged. As such, the district court's failure, not in refusing to 
define the words "genitals" and "breasts," but to clarify that the touching of breasts does 
not constitute lewd conduct, was erroneous. 
B. The Error Was Not Harmless 
The State has asserted that, "Even if the district court erred in not instructing the 
jury that breasts are not genitals, such an error would be harmless regarding Count II 
because that count did not involve any testimony or allegation that Crawford touched 
An.C.'s breasts." (Respondent's Brief, p.12.) Mr. Crawford notes that the State did not 
offer any argument that the error would be harmless in regards to Count I and, as such, 
the State has conceded that the error, if found, is not harmless as to that count. 
Further, Mr. Crawford asserts that the State's argument is misplaced. It is 
impossible to discern whether the jury reached its verdicts based on a proper theory or 
the improper theory that lewd conduct includes the touching of breasts. Both of the 
alleged victims presented testimony regarding both vaginal and breast area touching. 
(As.C.: Tr., p.198, Ls.6 - p.201, L. 7.) At a UFC party, Mr. Crawford allegedly grabbed 
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An.C.'s breast in front of others in a joking way. (Tr., p.251, L.12 - p.253, L.11.) 
Another time, while on the phone with her grandfather, Mr. Crawford allegedly began 
rubbing An.C.'s stomach and moving his had toward her shirt; she kept batting it away 
before he could touch any private areas. (Tr., p.254, L.1 - p.257, L.2.) 
The State is correct that in the Indictment, Count IV does mention breasts 
specifically, while Count II does not. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13; R., p.12.) The 
State is also correct that both parties did offer some explanation regarding what conduct 
was charged in which count. (Respondent's Brief, p.13; Tr., p.512, Ls.5-16; Tr., p.518, 
L.23 - p.519, L.4.) However, despite the mention of breasts in only one of the counts 
and closing arguments, the jury was still unsure what alleged acts went with each 
charge. The jury asked the district court, 
Can you confirm that 
Charge 1 = [As.C.] on the couch incident 
Charge 2 - [An.C.] being asked about "clit" 
Charge 3 - Penis exposure to [An.C.] 
Charge 4 - [An.C.] on phone with grandfather+ touching her 
(Augmentation: Jury Questions, Jury Question Number 4.) The district court informed 
the jury, over objection, that "The alleged victim in Count I is [As.C.]. The alleged victim 
in Counts II-IV is [An.C.] The jury is to rely on its memory of the evidence." 
(Augmentation: Jury Questions, Answer to Jury Question Number 4.) The mere 
presentation of this question clearly illustrates that the jury was unsure about matching 
the conduct with the charges. 
Further, contrary to the State's assertions, we cannot be sure that "Jury Question 
No. 3, asking whether breasts are genitals, did not reflect any misunderstanding about 
whether breasts were part of the conduct alleged in Count II." (Respondent's Brief, 
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pp.13-14.) As there was evidence regarding breast touching from both alleged victims, 
and the jury did not specify that its question was limited to Count I, it is difficult to 
determine whether or not the jury's question applied to both Count I and Count II. 
Therefore, because the jury heard testimony from both alleged victims that 
Mr. Crawford had touched their breast area and was confused about what conduct was 
alleged in each charge, it is impossible to discern whether or not the jury reached its 
verdict on a valid theory of law on both Counts I and II. As such, this Court cannot say 
the error is harmless in regards to Count 11 and should vacate both of Mr. Crawford's 
convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Crawford respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction. 
Mr. Crawford contends that the court improperly instructed the jury allowing it to convict 
him on conduct that did not amount to lewd conduct. Alternately, he requests that this 
Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2012. 
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